the unity of human personality is a unity of integration of many constituent parts. The paradox we see most vividly presented by the field of consciousness, but also in outward manifestations of co-operation and of opposition and conflict between the dynamic strivings of the constituent parts.

The monadic theory combines naturally with the mnemic theory ; that is to say, it accepts Lamarckian transmission, the continuity of individual with racial memory, and the essential sameness of these two diversely manifested mnemic functions. Bleuler's form of the mnemic theory differs from monadism only in postulating the material engram as the basis of memory. It is then, perhaps, fair to say that the monadic theory of the organism is maintained in these several forms : (i) Bleuler's version, of which the distinguishing feature is the material memory trace; (2) the true or thorough-going monadism or philosophical pluralism, best represented by James Ward ;

(3) the holism of Haldane and Whitehead stands near to this, agreeing with it in denying the existence of matter and pure mechanism, which are put aside as abstractions ;

(4) neutral monadism which postpones the question of dualism and of the relation between mind and body;

(5) dualistic monadism which combines psycho-physical dualism with Bergson's distinction between true memory (a function of the monads) and habit (a function of the brain-matter) and inclines to see in each neurone or brain-cell and perhaps each living cell (whether solitary

or a member of a system forming a multicellular organism)
an animated psycho-physical system.

This last form of the monadic theory has, so far as I know, never been seriously proposed. Yet in spite of the fact that so many philosophers look with horror on